Price Controls in the Postal Sector: A Welfare Analysis of Alternative Control Structures by Cremer, Helmuth et al.
Price Controls in the Postal Sector: A
Welfare Analysis of Alternative Control
Structures
Ph. De Donder, H. Cremer
University of Toulouse (IDEI and GREMAQ)
P. Dudley, F. Rodriguez (Royal Mail Group)1
February 14, 2007
Prepared for the fourth Toulouse Conference on Postal
Economics
1The analysis contained in this paper reects the views of the authors and may
not necessarily be those of Royal Mail Group.
1 Introduction
In setting price controls, regulators are likely to have a number of duties
and objectives. Typically, at the centre of these requirements for the postal
sector is likely to be a duty or objective to ensure the continuing provision
of universal postal service implying ubiquity of provision and geographical
uniformity of tari¤s for at least single piece mail items. Continuing provision
implies also setting a price control which ensures the nancial viability of
an (e¢ cient) universal service provider (USP). The optimal structure for a
price control reecting an objective of maximisation of allocative e¢ ciency
is that of a global price cap (GPC) (Billette et al, 2003). But regulators may
have other objectives which may be linked to their statutory duties. These
may include the promotion of competitive entry into the postal market and a
desire to keep the prices of at least single piece mail low for equity and social
reasons. For example, Panzar (2004) has suggested very convincingly that
regulators may wish to minimize the (highly visible and politically sensitive)
single-piece price while allowing the USP to break even. In seeking to achieve
a balance between these objectives, regulators may make trade-o¤s and adopt
rules that are non-optimal compared with the benchmark of the GPC.
In this paper, we examine some of these issues by comparing the results
of the second best (Ramsey) welfare-maximising program to those obtained
with alternative procedures that might be adopted by regulators in seeking to
achieve also other objectives. The focus of our paper is therefore on the struc-
ture of price controls in the postal sector and the implications and impacts
of regulators seeking to satisfy a range of objectives or duties including al-
locative e¢ ciency, equity and the promotion of entry while seeking to ensure
continuing provision of universal service. We do not try to model explicitly
the regulators objectives other than welfare-maximisation and to derive from
them the optimal price control mechanisms that should be imposed on the
USP. One reason why we do not follow this normative approach is that we do
not know how regulators weigh the di¤erent objectives that they may pur-
sue simultaneously. The approach this paper takes is more positive, starting
from price control mechanisms that are used in practice, and studying the
consequences of di¤erent policies and procedures in terms of price structure,
volume and welfare levels and other issues such as the continuing nancial
viability of the USP. Doing this requires not only to study these procedures
analytically, but also to resort to numerical simulations of a calibrated model.
In our model, the USP o¤ers both a single piece product and a business
mail product. A number of entrants, acting as a competitive fringe, o¤er a
bulk mail product that is an (imperfect) substitute to the bulk mail o¤ered
by the USP. This setting builds on De Donder et al. (2006a), but is richer
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in three dimensions. First, we assume two delivery areas (urban and rural)
instead of one, and impose the condition that the USP single-piece letter
price be the same in both delivery areas (while bulk mail prices may be
di¤erentiated across areas). Second and more importantly, we assume that
the USP sells access to its (rural and/or urban) delivery areas to the entrants.
In other words, the USP sells an intermediate good as well as two nal goods.
The entrants choose whether to deliver themselves in a given area or whether
to access the USPs delivery network in an area. Third, the presence of access
products as well as nal products allows us to study a wider variety of price
control procedures than is contained in De Donder et al. (2006a).
The paper proceeds as follows. Our model is set out further in section 2.
Section 3 studies analytically the two price control procedures we concentrate
on: a global price cap/Ramsey program with a minimum di¤erence between
bulk mail and access prices, and a price cap control with two baskets of
mail products. Section 4 calibrates the model while section 5 presents the
numerical results obtained with these price control mechanisms, depending
on whether access is available or not, and looks at their robustness. Section
6 studies the introduction of a universal service fund nanced by taxing the
entrantss output. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
There are two kinds of postal operators: the USP and a number of entrants.
The USP o¤ers two products (single-piece mail and bulk mail) to two delivery
areas (urban and rural). The USP is required to post a single price, denoted
by q, for single-piece mail delivered to either area. We denote the demand
function for single-piece mail delivered to area i = U;R by xi(q).
The entrants o¤er a bulk mail product for urban and rural delivery. En-
trants o¤er an identical service to each other, and behave like a competitive
fringe. Both bulk mail products (the one o¤ered by the USP and by the
entrants) are imperfect substitutes in any given area. The demand in one
area does not depend on the price charged for delivery to the other area.
The demand function for USP bulk mail delivered in area i = U;R is de-
noted by yIi (p
I
i ; p
E
i ) with p
I
i the USP price and p
E
i the entrants price, and
with @yIi (:)=@p
I
i < 0 and @y
I
i (:)=@p
E
i > 0: Similarly, the demand for the en-
trantss bulk mail product is given by yEi (p
I
i ; p
E
i ) with @y
E
i (:)=@p
E
i < 0 and
@yEi (:)=@p
I
i > 0:
The demand functions are derived from the maximization of net user
surplus, with gross user surplus given by Vi(xi) for single-piece mail sent
to area i and Ui(yIi ; y
E
i ) for bulk mail sent to area i. As is standard in
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this literature, we use surplus as a measure of welfare for rms buying mail
products (see Billette et al. (2003) for instance).
The postal activity is divided in two segments: the upstream segment
is composed of collection, sorting and transportation, while the downstream
segment is delivery. Each segment has a constant marginal cost. Upstream
marginal costs for the USP are cx for the single-piece good and cI for the
bulk mail product, with cx > cI . We assume the same USP delivery cost for
single-piece mail and for bulk mail, which we denote by dIi for delivery to
area i = U;R, with dIR > d
I
U . Similarly for the entrants, we have that rural
delivery of bulk mail, dER is more expensive than urban delivery, d
E
U .
In addition to selling the two end-to-end (E2E) goods (i.e. the goods that
use both the upstream and downstream USP segments), the USP also sells
entrants access to its delivery network in both areas for a unit price of ai,
i = U;R, which we call the access charge. We assume that the selling of access
to both areas is mandatory and has to be o¤ered by the USP. Entrants can
choose whether to bypass and deliver through their own network or to access
the USP delivery network in each area. Entrants will choose the cheapest
way to proceed and so access the USP delivery network in area i = U;R if
dEi > ai and bypass otherwise.
The universal service obligations translate into a xed cost F for the USP.
The entrantsprice is
pEi = c
E +min(ai; d
E
i ); i = U;R:
3 Price control procedures
As noted in the introduction, in practice regulators have several duties and
objectives to full when setting price controls in addition to ensuring the pro-
vision of the universal service, such as promoting competition and entry to
the sector and equity. The associated policy procedures may include multiple
baskets rather than a global control; accompanying cost allocation rules to
divide xed costs between products inside and outside of the price control;
and constraints on individual product prices and the relationship between
prices.1 In this section, we examine analytically the e¤ect of two such proce-
dures, namely, setting a minimum price di¤erence between bulk mail prices
and access prices which can be used as a way to promote and maintain entry
into the market; and multiple baskets which when linked to a cost allocation
rule such as EPMU can be viewed as another way to constrain prices and
1For example, in the UK policy procedures of this type are used in controlling the
universal service providers prices (Postal Services Commission, 2006).
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may act to support equity objectives and/or promote entry. We rst develop
our analysis without allowing for the possibility of bypass before showing the
analytical impact of its availability in section 3.3.
3.1 Ramsey prices with constraint on margin between
E2E and access price
In this subsection, we study the procedure where a minimum di¤erence be-
tween bulk mail and access prices is added to the classical Ramsey problem.
Our objective is to analyze the impact of this constraint on the optimal
prices. We show in an appendix that these prices can be decentralized us-
ing a suitable global price cap  i.e., a price cap that includes the access
products sold by the regulated operator.
The Ramsey, second best optimal prices maximize total welfare (net user
surplus plus postal rmsprots) subject to the USP breaking even. They
are the solution to
max
q;pIU ;p
I
R;aU ;aR
W =
X
i=U;R
Vi(xi) +
X
i=U;R
Ui(y
I
i ; y
E
i ) (1)
 (xU + xR)q   pIUyIU   pIRyIR   pEUyEU   pERyER
+(1 + )[(q   cx   dxU)xU + (q   cx   dxR)xR
+(pIU   cI   dIU)yIU + (pIR   cI   dIR)yIR
+(aU   dIU)yEU + (aR   dIR)yER   F ]
where  denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the USP prot constraint and
where the arguments of the demand functions have been omitted.
To this optimisation program, we add a constraint on the minimum di¤er-
ence between the access charge and the USP bulk mail price on both delivery
areas:
pIi   ai  mi; i = U;R (2)
with this minimum di¤erence mi chosen by the regulator. We assign the
Lagrange multipliers i, i = U;R to these constraints.
We obtain the following rst order conditions, for q, pIi and ai (i = U;R)
respectively:
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 (xU + xR) + (1 + )[xU + xR + (q   cx   dxU)@xU
@q
+ (q   c  dxR)@xR
@q
] = 0;
(3)
 yIi + (1 + )[yIi + (pIi   cI   dIi )
@yIi
@pIi
+ (ai   dIi )
@yEi
@pIi
] + i = 0; (4)
 yEi + (1 + )[yEi + (pIi   cI   dIi )
@yIi
@pEi
+ (ai   dIi )
@yEi
@pEi
]  i = 0: (5)
To interpret these conditions, we rst assume that the margin constraints
(2) are not binding at the optimum (i.e., i = 0). If the budget constraint
is not binding either (i.e.,  = 0), we obtain marginal cost pricing for bulk
mail as well as for access. The single-piece price is then given by a convex
combination of the marginal costs in both delivery areas.
However, given the xed cost, the USP does not break even with mar-
ginal cost pricing so that  has to be strictly positive at the optimum. Still
assuming that i = 0 and solving separately for ai, we obtain
ai = d
I
i + (p
I
i   cI   dIi )
  @yIi
@pEi
@yEi
@pEi
+

1 + 
yEi
@yEi
@pEi
; (6)
where the optimal access charge is the sum of the delivery cost, a foregone
prot term factored by the displacement ratio2 and a Ramsey term. If we go
further and solve simultaneously for ai and pIi , we obtain
ai = d
I
i +

1 + 
yEi
@yIi
@pIi
  yIi @y
I
i
@pEi
@yEi
@pIi
@yIi
@pEi
+
@yEi
@pEi
@yIi
@pIi
; (7)
pIi = c
I + dIi +

1 + 
yIi
@yEi
@pEi
  yEi @y
E
i
@pIi
@yEi
@pIi
@yIi
@pEi
+
@yEi
@pEi
@yIi
@pIi
; (8)
where both prices are expressed as the sum of marginal cost and of a Ramsey
term.
We now assume that the margin constraint is binding in area i. In that
case, it will prove easier to replace pIi by ai + mi in the modied Ramsey
problem rather than using the Lagrange multiplier method. While the rst
2See Armstrong (2002) and De Donder (2006).
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order condition for q is unchanged, the condition for the optimal access charge
becomes
 (yIi + yEi ) + (1 + )[yIi + yEi + (ai +mi   cI   dIi )(
@yIi
@pIi
+
@yIi
@pEi
)
+(ai   dIi )(
@yEi
@pIi
+
@yEi
@pEi
)] = 0; (9)
because increasing the access charge also increases the bulk mail price when
the constraint (2) is binding.
We start as previously by assuming that  = 0, in which case (9) simplies
to
ai = d
I
i + (c
I  mi)
@yIi
@pIi
+
@yIi
@pEi
@yIi
@pIi
+
@yIi
@pEi
+
@yEi
@pIi
+
@yEi
@pEi
: (10)
Recall that the Ramsey prices when  = 0 and in the absence of margin
constraint are equal to marginal cost, i.e. ai = dIi and p
I
i = c
I + dIi so that
pIi  ai = cI . Since we assume that the margin constraint is binding, we have
that cI < mi  i.e., the rst part of the second term in (10) is negative. As
for the second part of the second term, it is positive in the usual case where
direct price e¤ects on demands are larger (in absolute value) than cross price
e¤ects  i.e., @yIi =@p
I
i + @y
I
i =@p
E
i < 0 and @y
E
i =@p
I
i + @y
E
i =@p
E
i < 0: We
then obtain that ai < dIi i.e., that access charges are smaller than delivery
cost when the margin constraint is binding. The intuition for this result is
straightforward: in the absence of margin constraint and of (binding) prot
constraint, the optimal access charge equals the USP delivery cost. The
margin constraint is binding if and only if the minimum margin mi is larger
than the USP collection cost cI . In that case, the optimal access charge
decreases (compared to the situation without binding margin constraint)
and becomes smaller than the USP delivery cost, while the optimal bulk
mail price increases.
However, the presence of xed costs prevents the USP from breaking
even with these prices. The value of the Lagrange multiplier of the prot
constraint is then positive at equilibrium. We obtain that
ai = d
I
i + (c
I  mi)
@yIi
@pIi
+
@yIi
@pEi
@yIi
@pIi
+
@yIi
@pEi
+
@yEi
@pIi
+
@yEi
@pEi
+ 
 (yIi + yEi )
@yIi
@pIi
+
@yIi
@pEi
+
@yEi
@pIi
+
@yEi
@pEi
; (11)
where the third term plays the role of a Ramsey term, calling for a mark-up
that is inversely proportional to the sensitivity of the bulk mail demands to
prices. Given the addition of this term, the comparison with the optimal
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ai under the classical Ramsey problem is in general ambiguous. We will
then use numerical simulations to gain insights into possible direction of this
comparison.
3.2 Two separate price cap constraints
We now consider a case where the regulator imposes more than one price cap
constraint on the goods covered by these price caps. We treat here the two
basketcase where the regulator imposes separate price cap constraints on
single piece and on bulk mail products. We assume that the access products
belong to the bulk mail basket (since they are closer substitutes to the bulk
mail products than to the single-piece mail), but it is easy to modify the
analysis presented here to other cases.
We assume that the regulator sets the proportion of xed costs to be
recovered inside each basket.3 We denote by  the proportion of xed costs
that has to be recovered by the basket containing single piece mail. The
problem for the USP is then two fold. First, for this basket, the USP looks
for the (smallest) value of q such that
(q   cx   dxU)xU + (q   cx   dxR)xR = F:
Second, for the basket containing bulk mail, the USP solves
max
pIU ;p
I
R;aU ;aR
(pIU   cI   dIU)yIU + (pIR   cI   dIR)yIR (12)
+(aU   dIU)yEU + (aR   dIR)yER
  nIUpIU + nIRpIR + naUaU + naRaR   p
where  denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the price cap constraint in this
basket.
We assume in what follows that, once the regulator has chosen the value
of ,4 it sets the weights and average price in the bulk mail basket at their
optimal, welfare-maximizing levels given this constraint. In other words,
the price cap for the bulk mail basket is chosen by the regulator in order to
decentralize the optimal, third-best Ramsey prices for the bulk mail products
 i.e., the prices that maximize total welfare subject to the constraints that
the USP globally breaks even and that the proportion of the xed costs
covered by single piece mail is : This means that, although  does not
3This is also the approach adopted in De Donder et al. (2006b).
4In choosing this value the regulator may follow an accounting rule such as fully dis-
tributed costs.
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appear in (12), the value of  is used by the regulator when choosing the
values of nIi , nai and p.
Let us consider further the choice by the regulator of the proportion 
and denote by  the proportion of the xed cost recovered by the single-
piece product in the classical Ramsey program (1) (or equivalently, under
the optimal global price cap  see appendix, equation (14)). It is clear that,
if the regulator imposes two separate price caps but chooses  = , we end
up with the optimal second best situation. If  is set below , this will
drive the single-piece mail price down and the other prices up, compared to
their optimal second-best levels. Formally, the formulas for the equilibrium
competitive prices are still given by equations (7) and (8), but the value of 
is now larger than in the global Ramsey problem: by imposing that a higher-
than-optimal share of the xed costs be covered by the access and bulk mail
products, the regulator increases the tightness of the budget constraint for
this group of products, which in turn increases the Lagrange multiplier of this
constraint. We obtain the opposite result if  is set above . Finally, if 
is set at too extreme a level (too low or too high), it may become impossible
for the USP to satisfy the constraint in that no set of prices can be found
that will allow the USP to breakeven. To consider this issue further we use
numerical simulations.
3.3 Introducing bypass
We now consider the possibility that entrants are able to bypass the USP
delivery network. Bypass then will occur in area i if ai > dEi . We assume (as
will be the case in the numerical simulations) that bypass occurs in the urban
area only, i.e., that aU > dEU , aR < d
E
R. We further assume that the USP is
not allowed by the regulator to undercut the entrantsdelivery cost in order
to prevent bypass from occurring. On the other hand, the USP anticipates
that bypass will occur if the optimal urban access charge it chooses in the
previous two sub-sections is larger than the entrantsdelivery cost. In that
case, the USP has to integrate in its optimisation that bypass will prevail
in the urban area i.e., rst order conditions in the previous two sections
have to be modied to take into account that no prot will be made by the
USP through selling access to its delivery network in the urban area. This is
straightforward (and indeed simplies the analysis compared to the section
above). First note that the analytical formulations for the optimal single-
piece mail price, rural bulk mail price and rural access charge are not a¤ected
by the availability of urban bypass (although the equilibrium values of these
prices are a¤ected because of changes in the value of the Lagrange multipliers
at equilibrium). So for instance, the optimality conditions for q, pIR and aR
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are still given by (3), (4) and (5) above in the case of the Ramsey program
accompanied by a minimum margin requirement. For the urban bulk mail
price, equation (4) then simplies to
yIi + (1 + )(p
I
i   cI   dIi )
@yIi
@pIi
= 0 (13)
which gives the classical Ramsey price formulation.
4 Calibration
We now go beyond the consideration of rst order conditions, in order to
compare price, volume and welfare levels attained under the various price
control procedures. Use of numerical simulations through a calibrated version
of the model is especially important in assessing the impact of allowing for
(urban) bypass, since rst order conditions are not well suited to the case of
a binary decision such as bypass.
Our calibration assumptions are based on De Donder et al. (2006a), mod-
ied to take into account the fact that we have modelled two delivery areas
here. The assumptions are not estimates from a particular postal operator,
but our assessment is that they reect well the general nature of postal mar-
kets and cost structures given published empirical studies.5 We start from
the hypothetical situation where the USP does not face any entry. We as-
sume that the USP posts a price of 0.50 euro for the single piece product
and a price of 0.40 euro for its bulk mail product. Total quantities sold at
those prices are, respectively, 2 billion and 8 billion items. We assume that
80% of all mail ows are urban while 20% are rural, and that the direct price
elasticities are -0.2 for single-piece mail and -0.4 for bulk mail (same elasticity
in urban and rural markets). Finally, we calibrate linear demands based on
these quantities, prices and elasticities.
We need further information to calibrate the demand functions for bulk
mail products when the market is opened to competition. We use two types
of information: the extent of entry for di¤erent price congurations and the
substitutability between the two bulk mail products for consumers. With
regard to the extent of entry, we assume that entrants would capture 10%
of the total market for bulk mail if both bulk mail products had the same
price, and 50% of the market if entrants were to o¤er a 20% price discount
over the USP. On substitution between those products, we assume that the
5With regard to demand, see for example Florens et al (2002), Nankervis et al (2002)
and Tolley (2000); while on costs see for example Cazals et al (2005).
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displacement ratio (given by  (@yIi =@pEi )=(@yEi =@pEi )) is set at 0.75 in both
areas, which means that three quarters of the quantities sold by entrants are
e¤ectively displaced from the USP, while one quarter represents additional
volumes sold in the sector.
Table 1: Cost calibration
USP entrants
urban rural urban rural
Single-piece upstream cx = 0:18
delivery dxU = 0:11 dxR = 0:16
Bulk-mail upstream cI = 0:12 cE = 0:15
delivery dIU = 0:11 d
I
R = 0:16 d
E
U = 0:15 d
E
R = 0:36
Fixed cost F = 1680 0
The USP unit upstream cost is equal to 0.18 euro for single-piece mail
and 0.12 euro for bulk mail. The USP urban delivery cost (for both kinds of
mail) is 0.11 euro in the urban area and 0.16 euro in the rural area. The value
of the xed cost F equals 1 680 million euros so that the USP breaks even
in the hypothetical monopoly situation (including a normal rate of prot, F
equals 40% of revenue of 4.2 bn).
The entrantss collection cost cE is set at 0.15 euro, its delivery cost at
0.15 euro in the urban area and 0.36 euro in the rural area. The entrants
do not face any xed cost but we assume instead that entrants have higher
variable collection and delivery costs than the USP.
5 Results
5.1 Monopoly
Table 2 contains the results of the simulations carried out with the model
calibrated in the previous section. It reports prices (in euros), quantities (in
billion items), contributions to the USP prot and net user surpluses (both
in billions of euros) for various scenarios. The rst scenario studied, which we
will use as a benchmark, corresponds to the second-best (Ramsey) optimal
prices in the monopoly situation. It is reported under the heading Ramsey
in Table 2. Observe that these optimal prices di¤er from the prices we have
used to calibrate the model: the single-piece price q is higher (0.609 euro
instead of 0.5 euro) while the bulk mail prices are di¤erentiated according
to the delivery area. The contributions to the USP prot add up to 1.680
10
billion euros which is the value of the USP xed cost. The selling of single-
piece letters allows 35.1% of this xed cost to be covered with the rest being
nanced by the bulk mail products. The total welfare attained in this setting
is 6.510 billion euros and is constituted exclusively of user surpluses.
5.2 Competitive entry through access only
We now turn to the opening of the market to competition. The next three
columns in Table 2 assume that bypass is unavailable to the entrants. We rst
look at the second-best optimal prices under competition and compare them
with the optimal prices under monopoly. We obtain given our calibration
that the E2E USP prices are barely a¤ected by the opening to competition
and decrease very slightly. The single-piece volumes, contributions to the
covering of the xed costs and the user surplus they generate are then also
una¤ected. The USP bulk mail volumes decrease in both delivery areas, but
this is more than compensated by the volumes sold by the entrants. The
contribution to the USP prot of the bulk mail products decreases and the
selling of access compensates 6.3% of the xed costs. Consumers benet
from the availability of the entrantsbulk mail products and the economies
of scale from higher volumes being delivered through the USPs network so
that total welfare increases to 6.526 billion euros.
The next column in Table 2 considers the case where a constraint is
imposed on the minimum price di¤erence (or margin) between the bulk
mail price and the access charge in any given area. Note that, for the second-
best optimal prices, this margin is equal to 0.149 euro in the urban market
and 0.255 euro in the rural market. In the column headed Min Margin,
we impose the constraint that the margin should be equal to at least 0.17
euro6, so that this constraint binds at the optimum for the urban market
but not for the rural market. Comparing these results with the optimal
prices without this constraint, we obtain that the USP decreases its urban
access charge and increases its urban bulk mail price to satisfy the margin
constraint. Other prices are also a¤ected: the single-piece price and the
rural access charge decrease while the rural bulk mail price increases. The
entrantsprices decrease since both access charges decrease. With regard
to the volumes, the number of single-piece letters increases, which in turn
increases the net user surplus. The entrantsbulk mail volumes increase at
the expense of the USPs but overall volumes are higher than both the GPC
6We wish to consider the e¤ect of the minimum price di¤erence being greater than
that consistent with the set of optimal prices (0.149 euro). In this regard the specic value
chosen of 0.17 euro meets this requirement although a higher or lower value (above 0.149
euro) would have served equally to consider the impact of this constraint binding.
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cases so that the constraint on the margin induces both additional entry and
higher market volumes. The share of xed cost covered by the selling of
single-piece mail decreases to 32%, while the share covered by the selling of
access increases to 10.4%. The loss of user surplus in the bulk mail market
is larger than the gain in surplus in the single-piece market, so that total
welfare decreases compared to GPC to 6.515 billion euros.
We now turn to the price control mechanism where the regulator imposes
two separate price caps on the USP, with one cap on single-piece mail and an-
other cap on a second basket, composed of bulk mail and of access products.
This case is identied by the heading 2 basketin Table 2. We assume that
the regulator imposes the same cap on single-piece mail as the price used in
the hypothetical monopoly situation used to calibrate the model, i.e., that
q = 0:5 euro. This means that the prot made by selling single-piece letters
covers 23.8% of the USP xed cost. This proportion is lower than the one
obtained in the Ramsey case, so using the notation introduced in section 3.2.,
we have that  < : We then assume that the second price cap is set opti-
mally by the regulator, conditional on the constraint that this basket should
fund the remaining 76.2% of the xed cost. Compared with the Ramsey case,
all prices in the second basket (bulk mail and access) are higher, volumes are
lower including those for the market overall and user surpluses from bulk
mail are lower. The total welfare level attained decreases compared to the
second-best level, and it happens to be close to the level obtained under the
Min Marginscenario.
Observe that the gap between the single-piece price and the rural USP
bulk mail price is very low in the this scenario (0.047 euro). This means
that, if the preparation cost incurred by bulk mail senders is larger than
0.047 euro, non residential senders would pay less to use single-piece mail
than bulk mail in the rural area. Obviously, if this constraint is binding at
the optimum, it will lead to lower welfare levels than those reported in Table
2.
5.3 Competitive entry through access and bypass
We now look at the impact of allowing for bypass on the equilibrium prices,
volumes and welfare. Observe that the optimal access charge with a GPC
is larger than the entrantss delivery cost on the urban area (0.21 euro com-
pared to 0.15 euro) while it is lower in the rural area (0.269 euro compared to
0.36 euro). This would result in urban bypass by the entrants, a situation we
model in the last column of Table 2. More precisely, we study the second-best
optimal prices when the USP does not provide access to its urban delivery
network. Comparing this case with the situation without urban bypass, we
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obtain that the USP reacts to the loss of urban access volumes by increasing
its single-piece price by more than 0.24 euro. As a consequence, the share
of xed costs covered by the single piece product increases from 35.1% to
56.5%. Both the rural access charge and the price paid for the USPs rural
bulk mail also increase with bypass. The bulk mail products o¤ered by the
two competitors are strategic complements, so the urban USP bulk mail price
decreases when the entrantss bulk mail price decreases due to bypass. With
regard to welfare, user surplus decreases for all products except urban bulk
mail. Total welfare decreases with bypass and is even lower than the wel-
fare level attained in the monopoly situation under this calibration although
volumes are higher than in the other cases so that the decline in welfare is
relatively modest. This result conrms the similar results we have obtained
in De Donder et al. (2006a) and De Donder (2006).
By extension, from these papers and from the results for no bypass, the
additional constraints in the min marginand 2 basketcases would reduce
total welfare further in the case of bypass compared with the no bypass and
monopoly cases (see De Donder et al. (2006b)).
5.4 Robustness
We test the robustness of our results to two assumptions: the degree of di¤er-
entiation between bulk mail products o¤ered by both competitors (measured
by the displacement ratio) and entrantse¢ ciency.
In the case of a higher di¤erentiation, where the displacement ratio is
lowered from 0.75 to 0.6 and reported in Table 3, the ranking of the di¤erent
cases is not a¤ected by this change: the highest level of welfare is attained
under competition with Ramsey prices and no bypass possibility. Adding
constraints to the Ramsey problem, such as a minimum margin between
prices or separating goods in two baskets decreases the welfare level, which
nevertheless remains larger than the highest welfare level attainable in the
monopoly situation. On the other hand, allowing for bypass in the Ram-
sey case results in urban bypass and in a total welfare level lower than the
monopoly situation. The price of single piece mail again rises very substan-
tially in this case. Finally, modifying the degree of product di¤erentiation
a¤ects which (if any) minimum margin constraint is binding, and also the
size of the welfare cost of adding such a constraint, or of splitting the mail
products in two baskets.
As a second sensitivity, we assume that the entrants are more e¢ cient
than the USP both for collection (0.09 euro cost compared to 0.12 euro for the
USP, and to 0.15 euro in the benchmark calibration) and for urban delivery
(0.07 euro cost compared to 0.11 euro for the USP, and to 0.15 euro in the
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benchmark calibration). As for rural delivery, we maintain the assumption
that it would be extremely costly for the entrants to build a delivery network
there. Results for these cost calibrations (together with the original value for
the displacement ratio between bulk mail products of 0.75) are reported in
Table 4.
We rst obtain that welfare increases in all cases when the entrants are
more e¢ cient. If bypass is not available, the USP reacts to more e¢ cient
entrants by increasing its access charges and decreasing its bulk mail prices.
The total quantity sold by the entrants increases signicantly, and the busi-
ness of selling access takes a lot more importance for the USP, because of both
the higher volumes and the higher margins made on this business. The wel-
fare cost of imposing minimum margin constraints or two baskets are quite
small (in terms of the welfare gain of moving from the optimal monopoly
situation to the optimal competitive situation) : this makes sense, since the
opening to competition increases total welfare more when entrantscosts are
low. The picture is very di¤erent once bypass is available: total welfare in-
creases, but all the gains from having lower entrantscosts are captured by
consumers of urban bulk mail, while other consumers lose surplus because of
the very large increase in the USP single-piece price.
6 Introducing a universal service fund
Up to now, we have assumed that the USPs xed cost has to be nanced by
the USP selling (single-piece and bulk ) mail products as well as access to the
entrants. One problem we have identied with this method is that the mark-
up over the marginal access cost may induce the entrants to (ine¢ ciently)
bypass the USP delivery network, especially in the urban area. Another way
to nance (at least in part) the USP xed cost is to impose a tax on the
entrantsoutput7, whose proceeds would be directed into a universal service
fund that would reimburse the USP for (part of) its xed cost. The main
advantage of this output tax is that, unlike a mark-up over the marginal
access cost, it does not induce ine¢ cient bypass of the USP network, since
the output tax has to be paid by the entrants whatever their delivery method
(see Armstrong 2006).
More precisely, we assume that a specic tax of  euro is imposed on
the entrantsoutput, whose proceeds go into the universal service fund. The
7Alternatively, we could assume that the USP also has to pay the output tax. This
would not change the results we obtain below, since the USP price-cost margin is already
an implicit output tax.
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value of this tax is set exogenously by the regulator.8 Formally, to the USP
prot formula (equation (14) in the appendix), we now add the tax proceeds
 i.e., 
 
yEU (p
I
U ; p
E
U ) + y
E
R(p
I
R; p
E
R)

:We keep the assumption of a competitive
fringe behaviour of the entrants, so that entrants break even with pEi =
cE +  + min(ai; d
E
i ); i = U;R: It is clear that the value of the tax does not
impact the bypass decision of the entrants.
We rst look at the impact of imposing an exogenous tax  in the cases
where bypass is not available to the entrants. In these cases, the tax  and
the access charges aU and aR are perfectly substitutable: it is the sum of
 and aU and of  and aR that matters both to the entrantss price and to
the USP prot, and any increase in the exogenous  results in a decrease
of the same amount of both access charges. Intuitively, taxing output and
posting a mark-up over the marginal access costs produce identical results
when the postal production technology is such that one unit of input (use of
USP delivery network) is always needed to produce one unit of output (bulk
mail).
Consider next the case where bypass is allowed. Recall that, in our bench-
mark simulations reported in Table 2, urban bypass occurs in the Ramsey
scenario because the optimal access charge in that case (0.21 euro  second
column in Table 2) is larger than the entrantsdelivery cost (0.15 euro). This
corresponds to the case where =0. Increasing  from 0 results in a decrease
by the same amount of both aU and aR. Because of the substitutability
between  and the access charges, the optimum urban access charge (when
the USP does not take bypass possibilities into account) stays larger than
0.15 euro as long as  is smaller than 0.06 euro. On the other hand, for 
larger than 0.06 euro, the optimal access charge becomes smaller than the
entrantss delivery cost, and the entrants choose access rather than bypass.
Table 5 illustrates numerically these results for the Ramsey case when
bypass is available to the entrants. The rst column corresponds to  = 0 
i.e., the case with urban bypass reported in the last column of Table 2. The
next three columns correspond to positive values of  (0.01 euro, 0.03 euro
and 0.05 euro) smaller than 0.06 euro  i.e., to cases where urban bypass
occurs because 0.21 euro   > 0:15 euro. The last column corresponds to
the case where  is exogenously set at a value larger than 0.06 euro  i.e.,
when the value of  is large enough to allow the USP to decrease its urban
access charge below the entrantsdelivery cost.
We now look at the impact of increasing the exogenous tax  on equilib-
rium prices, volumes, contributions to USP prot and user surpluses in the
8Our focus below is on how the value of the output tax rate a¤ects the market equilib-
rium, rather than in nding its second-best optimal level.
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Ramsey case. Increasing  allows the USP to post a lower single-piece mail
price, resulting in higher volumes and higher user surpluses. Increasing 
generates an increase in the USP bulk mail price and a decrease in the USP
rural bulk mail price. The entrantsprices move in the same direction as the
USP bulk mail prices. These price changes produce an increase in the USPs
bulk mail volumes, a decrease in the entrantss urban bulk mail volumes,
and have a non monotone impact on the USP rural bulk mail volume. The
impact of a larger  on total postal volumes are also non monotone, with
rst a decrease and then an increase.
The contribution to the USP prot of single-piece mail (both urban and
rural) decreases with  . The share of urban bulk mail increases while that
of rural bulk mail decreases. Interestingly, the share of tax proceeds is non
monotone: it is rst increasing, then decreasing in  . Observe that this share
stays quite low, of the order of 1% of total xed costs, as long as bypass
occurs. Finally, the surplus of all consumers increases, except for the urban
bulk mail buyers. Total welfare increases with the tax, but stays below the
monopoly level (6.510 bn euros) as long as the tax is below that resulting in
bypass.
The main results we obtain with entrantsoutput taxation are as follows.
If bypass does not occur, the output tax and the access charge levels are
perfect substitutes, and the equilibrium is not a¤ected by the precise value
of the tax. If bypass occurs, the value of the tax has an impact on the
equilibrium: a higher tax leads to a lower single-piece mail price and higher
urban bulk mail prices, so that total welfare increases even though urban
bulk mail consumerssurplus decreases.
7 Conclusion
In setting price controls, regulators in the postal sector may consider addi-
tional objectives to the goals of ensuring the continuing provision of universal
service and maximising allocative e¢ ciency and, hence, introduce procedures
to meet these additional objectives. In this paper, we have explored aspects of
these issues by considering the impacts and e¤ects of regulators in the postal
sector adopting price control procedures that seek to achieve objectives other
than the maximisation of allocative e¢ ciency and economic welfare. Clearly
these procedures result in lower levels of welfare than those from the bench-
mark of GPC.
Our initial results from the numerical calibration of our model indicate
that in the case where entry is conned only to access, a range of proce-
dures appear capable of meeting objectives for universal service, equity and
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competitive entry, prospectively, with quite small adverse impacts on eco-
nomic welfare. If these non-e¢ ciency objectives are valued highly then it
appears that the welfare costs of meeting them may be worth incurring at
least at the calibration values initially adopted in our model. However, if
bypass is available these trade o¤s become more costly. Under GPC, welfare
is lower and the single piece price signicantly higher than when only access
is available to potential entrants. By extension from the no bypass case, the
welfare costs and potential for non-achievement of at least some objectives
increase with the extent of entry through bypass. We consider also the e¤ect
of introducing a universal service fund.
Our analysis has considered these price control procedures individually.
However, where a regulator is seeking to achieve a number of objectives
simultaneously this may lead to the combined application of some of these
procedures or their application with other similar rules and constraints. This
is likely to lead to further divergence from the GPC benchmark. Under these
circumstances also there is an increase in the likelihood that one or more
objectives may not be met or only met by violating the breakeven constraint.
Such possibilities and trade-o¤s can be explored further through our model
by examining a range of parameter values and combinations of non-optimal
procedures.
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Table 2: Simulations results9
Monopoly Competition
No Bypass Bypass
Ramsey Ramsey Min Margin 2 basket Ramsey
Prices:
-single-piece q 0.609 0.608 0.577 0.500 0.853
-USP bulk pIU 0.360 0.359 0.372 0.386 0.287
pIR 0.424 0.424 0.432 0.453 0.538
-access aU - 0.210 0.202 0.231 -
aR - 0.269 0.262 0.292 0.357
-entrants pEU - 0.360 0.352 0.381 0.300
pER - 0.419 0.412 0.442 0.507
Quantities:
-single-piece xU 1.531 1.531 1.551 1.600 1.374
xR 0.383 0.383 0.388 0.400 0.344
Total 1.913 1.914 1.939 2.000 1.718
-USP bulk yIU 6.599 5.909 5.319 5.753 6.221
yIR 1.623 1.526 1.411 1.486 1.370
Total 8.222 7.435 6.730 7.239 7.591
Total USP volumes 10.135 9.349 8.669 9.239 9.308
-Entrants bulk yEU - 0.922 1.601 0.898 1.142
yER - 0.130 0.266 0.126 0.116
Total - 1.052 1.867 1.024 1.258
Total market volumes 10.135 10.401 10.536 10.263 10.567
9Prices are in euros and volumes in billion items.
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Table 2 (continued): Simulations results10
Monopoly Competition
No Bypass Bypass
Ramsey Ramsey Min Margin 2 basket Ramsey
Contributions to Prot
-single-piece urban 0.488 0.487 0.445 0.336 0.774
rural 0.103 0.103 0.092 0.064 0.176
-USPs bulk urban 0.856 0.765 0.754 0.897 0.354
rural 0.234 0.219 0.215 0.257 0.354
-Access urban - 0.092 0.147 0.108 -
rural - 0.014 0.027 0.017 0.023
Share of single-piece 0.351 0.351 0.319 0.238 0.565
Share of Access - 0.063 0.104 0.074 0.014
Net User Surpluses
-single-piece urban 1.830 1.831 1.879 2.000 1.475
rural 0.458 0.458 0.470 0.500 0.369
-bulk urban 3.317 3.330 3.271 3.156 3.832
rural 0.906 0.907 0.896 0.860 0.731
Sum 6.510 6.526 6.515 6.516 6.407
10Prot and surpluses are in billion euros.
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Table 3: Simulations results11with  = 0:6
Monopoly Competition
No Bypass Bypass
Ramsey Ramsey Min Margin 2 basket Ramsey
Prices:
-single-piece q 0.609 0.606 0.599 0.500 0.839
-USP bulk pIU 0.360 0.359 0.362 0.385 0.296
pIR 0.424 0.423 0.420 0.452 0.532
-access aU - 0.193 0.192 0.209 -
aR - 0.249 0.247 0.267 0.317
-entrants pEU - 0.343 0.342 0.359 0.300
pER - 0.399 0.397 0.417 0.467
Quantities:
-single-piece xU 1.531 1.532 1.537 1.600 1.383
xR 0.383 0.383 0.384 0.400 0.346
Total 1.913 1.915 1.921 2.000 1.729
-USP bulk yIU 6.599 5.478 5.385 5.337 5.766
yIR 1.623 1.449 1.453 1.412 1.308
Total 8.222 6.927 6.838 6.749 7.074
Total USP volumes 10.135 8.842 8.759 8.749 8.803
-Entrants bulk yEU - 1.879 1.994 1.831 2.090
yER - 0.293 0.294 0.286 0.265
Total - 2.172 2.288 2.117 2.355
Total market volumes 10.135 11.015 11.047 10.865 11.158
11Prices are in euros and volumes in billion items.
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Table 3 (continued): Simulations results12with  = 0:6
Monopoly Competition
No Bypass Bypass
Ramsey Ramsey Min Margin 2 basket Ramsey
Contributions to Prot
-single-piece urban 0.488 0.484 0.475 0.336 0.759
rural 0.103 0.102 0.100 0.064 0.173
-USPs bulk urban 0.856 0.705 0.713 0.825 0.378
rural 0.234 0.207 0.203 0.242 0.329
-Access urban - 0.156 0.164 0.182 -
rural - 0.026 0.026 0.031 0.041
Share of single-piece 0.351 0.349 0.342 0.238 0.555
Share of Access - 0.108 0.113 0.127 0.025
Net User Surpluses
-single-piece urban 1.830 1.834 1.845 2.000 1.494
rural 0.458 0.458 0.461 0.500 0.374
-bulk urban 3.317 3.365 3.346 3.194 3.805
rural 0.906 0.911 0.917 0.865 0.743
Sum 6.510 6.569 6.568 6.559 6.416
12Prot and surpluses are in billion euros.
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Table 4: Simulations results13with cE = 0:09; dEU = 0:07
Monopoly Competition
No Bypass Bypass
Ramsey Ramsey Min Margin 2 basket Ramsey
Prices:
-single-piece q 0.609 0.601 0.574 0.500 1.005
-USP bulk pIU 0.360 0.357 0.377 0.381 0.265
pIR 0.424 0.421 0.439 0.447 0.609
-access aU - 0.215 0.207 0.235 -
aR - 0.274 0.269 0.295 0.426
-entrants pEU - 0.305 0.297 0.325 0.160
pER - 0.364 0.359 0.385 0.516
Quantities:
-single-piece xU 1.531 1.535 1.553 1.600 1.277
xR 0.383 0.384 0.388 0.400 0.319
Total 1.913 1.919 1.941 2.000 1.596
-USP bulk yIU 6.599 4.387 3.591 4.282 2.796
yIR 1.623 1.129 0.962 1.102 0.939
Total 8.222 5.516 4.553 5.384 3.734
Total USP volumes 10.135 7.435 6.494 7.384 5.330
-Entrants bulk yEU - 2.976 3.857 2.905 5.900
yER - 0.666 0.854 0.650 0.554
Total - 3.642 4.711 3.555 6.453
Total market volumes 10.135 11.076 11.205 10.939 11.783
13Prices are in euros and volumes in billion items.
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Table 4 (continued): Simulations results14with  = 0:6
Monopoly Competition
No Bypass Bypass
Ramsey Ramsey Min Margin 2 basket Ramsey
Contributions to Prot
-single-piece urban 0.488 0.478 0.440 0.336 0.913
rural 0.103 0.100 0.091 0.064 0.212
-USPs bulk urban 0.856 0.556 0.529 0.646 0.098
rural 0.234 0.159 0.153 0.184 0.309
-Access urban - 0.312 0.375 0.362 -
rural - 0.076 0.093 0.088 0.148
Share of single-piece 0.351 0.344 0.316 0.238 0.670
Share of Access - 0.231 0.278 0.268 0.088
Net User Surpluses
-single-piece urban 1.830 1.841 1.884 2.000 1.273
rural 0.458 0.460 0.471 0.500 0.318
-bulk urban 3.317 3.452 3.396 3.289 4.423
rural 0.906 0.933 0.919 0.889 0.645
Sum 6.510 6.687 6.669 6.678 6.660
14Prot and surpluses are in billion euros.
24
Table 5: Simulations results15with universal service fund
Competition - Ramsey
Bypass No Bypass
 : 0 0:01 0:03 0:05 > 0:06
Prices:
-single-piece q 0.853 0.821 0.762 0.710 0.608
-USP bulk pIU 0.287 0.294 0.308 0.323 0.359
pIR 0.538 0.523 0.496 0.471 0.424
-access aU - - - - 0.210
aR 0.357 0.335 0.294 0.256 0.269
-entrants pEU 0.300 0.310 0.330 0.350 0.360
pER 0.507 0.485 0.474 0.456 0.419
Quantities:
-single-piece xU 1.374 1.395 1.432 1.466 1.531
xR 0.344 0.349 0.358 0.366 0.383
Total 1.718 1.743 1.790 1.832 1.914
-USP bulk yIU 6.221 6.314 6.485 6.637 5.909
yIR 1.370 1.315 1.428 1.462 1.526
Total 7.591 7.629 7.913 8.098 7.435
Total USP volumes 9.308 9.373 9.703 9.931 9.349
-Entrants bulk yEU 1.142 0.957 0.603 0.269 0.922
yER 0.116 0.219 0.121 0.124 0.130
Total 1.258 1.176 0.725 0.393 1.052
Total market volumes 10.567 10.548 10.428 10.324 10.401
15Prices are in euros and volumes in billion items.
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Table 5 (continued): Simulations results16with US fund
Competition - GPC
Bypass No Bypass
 : 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 >0.06
Contributions to Prot
-single-piece urban 0.774 0.740 0.676 0.615 0.487
rural 0.176 0.168 0.151 0.135 0.103
-USPs bulk urban 0.354 0.402 0.507 0.619 0.765
rural 0.354 0.320 0.308 0.279 0.219
-Access urban - - - - access+tax=0.092
rural 0.023 0.038 0.016 0.012 access+tax=0.014
-Tax urban - 0.010 0.018 0.013
rural - 0.002 0.004 0.006
Share of single-piece 0.565 0.541 0.492 0.447 0.351
Share of Access 0.014 0.023 0.010 0.007 access+tax=0.063
Share of Tax 0 0.007 0.013 0.012
Net User Surpluses
-single-piece urban 1.475 1.520 1.603 1.679 1.831
rural 0.369 0.380 0.401 0.420 0.458
-bulk urban 3.832 3.778 3.671 3.563 3.330
rural 0.731 0.754 0.794 0.832 0.907
Sum 6.407 6.432 6.468 6.493 6.526
16Prot and surpluses are in billion euros.
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Appendix
We show how to decentralize the Ramsey second-best optimal prices with
a minimum margin constraint (section 3.1.) using a global price cap. With
a global price cap, the USP maximizes its prot subject to the constraint
that an average of its prices cannot exceed a certain level, which we call the
price cap. The regulator sets both the price cap and the weights to be used
by the USP when calculating its average price. The USP then optimizes by
choosing the level of its individual prices.
Assume for the moment that the regulator has chosen the following weights:
nx for single-piece price, nIi for bulk mail in area i and nai for access charge
to area i, as well as the average price of p. The optimization program of the
USP is then
max
q;pIU ;p
I
R;aU ;aR
(q   cx   dxU)xU + (q   cx   dxR)xR (14)
+(pIU   cI   dIU)yIU + (pIR   cI   dIR)yIR
+(aU   dIU)yEU + (aR   dIR)yER   F
  nxq + nIUpIU + nIRpIR + naUaU + naRaR   p
where  denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the price cap constraint and
where the arguments of the demand functions have been omitted. We add to
this classical GPC the margin constraints (2) and denote by  i the Lagrange
multiplier for the margin constraint in area i. The rst order condition for q
is given by
xU + xR + (q   cx   dxU)@xU
@q
+ (q   c  dxR)@xR
@q
  nx = 0; (15)
while the rst-order conditions for bulk mail prices and access charges are
given by
yIi + (p
I
i   cI   dIi )
@yIi
@pIi
+ (ai   dIi )
@yEi
@pIi
  nIi +  i = 0; (16)
yEi + (p
I
i   cI   dIi )
@yIi
@pEi
+ (ai   dIi )
@yEi
@pEi
  nai    i = 0: (17)
We denote the prices solving the modied Ramsey problem (equations
(3), (4) and (5)) with a star: q; pIi and a

i ; i = U;R. The decentralization
of these prices requires that there exist values  and i of the Lagrange
multipliers such that (q; pIi ; a

i , 
; i ) solve (15),(16) and (17). For this,
the values of the weights and of the price cap must be chosen carefully by
the regulator. Comparing the rst order conditions of the modied Ramsey
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problem and of the GPC with margin constraints, one can show that the
weights should be set equal to the corresponding third-best quantities,
nx = xU(q
) + xR(q);
nIi = y
I
i (p
I
i ; c
E + ai );
nai = y
E
i (p
I
i ; c
E + ai );
and the average price to the corresponding average
p = nxq
 + nIU p
I
U + n
I
R p
I
R + n

aUa

U + n

aRa

R:
One can verify that the Lagrange multipliers of the price-cap constraint and
of the minimum margin constraints are given by
 =
1
1 + 
;
i =
i
1 + 
;
where  (resp. i ) is the optimal value of the Lagrange multiplier of the
budget constraint (resp., of the minimum margin constraint in area i) in the
modied Ramsey problem.
In words, the decentralisation properties of the GPC still hold when an
(arbitrary) constraint is imposed on the Ramsey problem. This general-
izes the decentralization results developed for a generic network industry
in La¤ont and Tirole (1996) and applied to the postal sector by Crew and
Kleindorfer (1995) and Billette et al. (2003).
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